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Over the years, religion has figured significantly in death penalty eases
not only at closing argument but at various other points. Although the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses speak directly and broadly to issues of rlig-
ion, they have been almost entirely overlooked in this context. in this Article,
Professors Simson and Garvey maintain that the Religion Clauses should be
seen as central to a proper understanding of the role of religion in capital
cases. Focusing on several common uses of religion in capital cases, the Au-
thors demonstrate that, if the Religion Clauses are given their due, religion
will play a much more limited role in capital cases than it does today.
INTRODUCTION
[1]n dosing this trial, I ask you to remember the dead. I ask you to
go with me to that lonely churchyard, and stand for a moment with
me by the grave of this unfortunate girl; let us there with bared
heads, say a few words in praise of her innocent young life,-she
who had a right to live for years in this garden of God's beauty,
suddenly taken off and hurled into eternity. Let us write an epitaph
on her tomb: "Murdered innocence."
Would to God, gentlemen, we could call her back. Would to
God we could bring her back to life once more and could put her
loving hand in his, and send them out into the bright world forgiven,
wiser and better for this sad experience, to live their lives together
as man and wife, according to God's holy ordinance. But it is too
late. She has gone. Her lovely spirit has left the earth. The die is
cast. A terrible doom has settled over this defendant. And we cm
now only listen to the command of the great Jehovah, "Wosoever
sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed"!I
So argued a prosecutor in 1892 in a highly publicized New York mur-
der trial of a young doctor accused of poisoning his wife.2 Times have
changed, but appeals to religion remain a common feature of cases in
which the state seeks the death penalty. Indeed, religion has played,
and continues to play, a prominent role not only at closing argument3
but at various other points of capital trials. Injury selection, peremp-
tory challenges have been exercised against prospective jurors on the
basis of their religion.4 At the sentencing phase,- defendants have of-
I Francis L Wellman, Summation for the People in the Carijle Harris Murder Trial, in
F.ious AMERICANJURY SPEEcHEs 261, 299 (Frederick C. Hicks ed., 1925).
2 See id. at 261-62 (summarizing the facts of the case).
3 See infra Part Ill.
4 See infra Part I.
5 Capital trials are bifurcated. At the first stage thejury decides the defendant's guilt
or innocence; at the second it decides whether to impose life imprisonment or death. S&e
WELSH S. , Hr" , THE DEATH PENALr IN THE NinEmis: AN E- 0i.MMON OF THEMODER%
SYSEM OF GA.ITAL PUNISHMar 73 (1991); Phyllis L Crocker, Contpts of culpability and
Deathworthiness, Differentiating Between Guilt and Punislnent in Dtath PenalAy Cases, 66 Fora.
AM L Rzv. 21, 23-25 & n.5 (1997).
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fered as mitigating evidence proof of their religiosity,6 and the prose-
cution has introduced evidence of the victim's religiosity.7 During
deliberations, jurors have engaged in group prayer" and tried to sway
one another with quotes from scripture.9
Such practices have not gone unquestioned. Rather remarkably,
however, the questions have almost always been framed and answered
with little or no attention to the two clauses of the Constitution that
speak directly and broadly to issues of religion: the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. 10 Whatever the cause
of this inattention-perhaps some combination of criminal lawyers'
limited familiarity with the intricacies of Religion Clauses doctrine
and religious liberty specialists' limited familiarity with problems of
criminal procedure-this Article attempts to remedy it. We limit our
focus to death penalty cases because those are the cases in which relig-
ion has figured most frequently and dramatically. To the extent, how-
ever, that religion has come into play in cases in which life and death
are not on the line, our analysis in this Article generally applies and
answers the questions that would be raised in those cases if the Relig-
ion Clauses were given their due.
After examining religion-based peremptory challenges in Part I,
we turn in Part II to the types of religiously related evidence com-
monly offered to persuade the jury to vote for life or death. Part III
focuses on appeals to religion in closing argument, and the influence
of religion on jury deliberations is the subject of Part IV. In each Part,
we begin with a brief description of the way in which courts generally
have analyzed the validity of particular uses of religion. Then, apply-
ing the Religion Clauses as interpreted by the Supreme Court in other
contexts, we analyze the validity of those uses from the perspective of
the Religion Clauses. Although careful consideration of the Religion
Clauses at times only confirms the correctness of conclusions that the
courts have reached by other routes, we hope to demonstrate that it
also calls for important changes in the way in which capital trials are
run."
6 See infra Part ILA.1 & B.1.
7 See infra Part H.A.2 & B.2.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 175-82.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 18388.
10 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as making the Religion Clauses
applicable to state and local government. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947)
(Establishment Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (Free Exercise
Clause). For discussion of the Religious Test Clause of Article VI, which speaks directly but
much more narrowly to issues of religion, see infra note 60.
11 In some instances it could be argued that these changes would be forthcoming If
the courts were to apply, for example, the Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment
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RELIGION 1N DEATH PENALTY CASES
I
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Capital jurors, like all jurors, must be impartial. They must not
stand in favor of or in opposition to the death penalty as a matter of
principle, imposing life or death without regard to the particulars of
the crime or the history of the defendant. Any members of the jury
pool whose religious beliefs or convictions would "prevent or substan-
tially impair"12 them from following the law can properly be excused
for cause. Thus, for example, if a Catholic veniremember reveals on
voir dire that she could never, consistent with her religious convic-
tions, vote to impose death, the prosecutor would be entirelyjustified
in asking that she be removed for cause.
Imagine instead that the prosecutor simply learns from a
veniremember's responses during voir dire or his answers to the juror
questionnaire or from other sources that the veniremember is Catho-
lic. Can the prosecutor constitutionally exercise a peremptory chal-
lenge against him based on his religion and the assumption that
Catholics have personal objections to the death penalty that wil sway
their vote against death?
The courts usually answer questions of this sort by reasoning from
the Supreme Court's treatment of race- and gender-based perempto-
ries under the Equal Protection Clause. Thus far, this method of anal-
ysis has yielded no clear answer among the courts. After discussing
the state of the case law on religion-based peremptories, we suggest
that the questions they present should not cause the courts great diffi-
culty if analyzed from the perspective of the First Amendment's Relig-
ion Clauses.
A. The Lessons of Batson
In Batson v. Kentucky'3 the Supreme Court held that the state can-
not use peremptory challenges to exclude veniremembers from the
jury solely because they, like the defendant, are black.' 4 According to
the Court in Batson, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment bars the state from exercising a peremptory challenge
against a veniremember based on nothing more than the
differently than they do. It is beyond the scope of this Article, however, to consider such
possibilities. For present purposes, we take as given the courts' understanding of the con-
straints imposed by these other provisions.
12 Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
424 (1985) (quoting Adams).
13 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
14 Id. at 89 ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge po-
tential jurors solely on account of their race or on tie assumption that black jtrors as a
group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant.").
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veniremember's race.15 Under Batson, if a defense attorney objects to
a prosecutor's peremptory challenge as race-based, the prosecutor
must come forward with a plausible race-neutral reason for the chal-
lenge. If the prosecutor is unable to offer such a reason, the trial
court should disallow the challenge. 16
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has extended Batson's
mandate beyond race-based prosecutorial challenges.1 7 Not only race
but gender too is now an impermissible basis for exercising a peremp-
tory challenge. 18 Likewise, Batson now applies not only in criminal
actions but in civil ones too,' 9 and it binds defense attorneys as well as
prosecutors. 20 Also, a party may object to a peremptory challenge as
race- or gender-based even if the party's race or gender differs from
the challenged veniremember's. 21
But does Batson apply to religion too? Although the Supreme
Court as a whole has not yet addressed the issue, Justices Thomas and
Scalia have argued strongly for applicability. Dissenting from a denial
of certiorari in Davis v. Minnesota2 -a case squarely presenting the
issue-they maintained that "given the Court's rationale in J.E.B. [for
extending Batson to gender], no principled reason immediately ap-
pears for declining to apply Batson to any strike based on a classifica-
tion [like religion] that is accorded heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause."23 However, in a very brief opinion concur-
ring in the denial of certiorari in Davis, Justice Ginsburg seemed to
15 Id.
16 Id. at 97 ("Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing [of purposeful dis-
crimination] the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for
challenging black jurors.").
17 For a critique of the Court's Batson jurisprudence and an alternative approach to
the problem of racial discrimination in jury selection, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Lan-
guage and Culture (Not to Say Race) ofPeremptoy Challenges, 35 WM. & MAv L. REV. 21 (1993).
18 SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
19 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
20 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
21 The Court in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991), established this principle for
race before it extended Batson to gender inJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S, 127 (1994). After
J.E.B. the Court's logic in Powers plainly applies to gender as well as race.
22 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) (mem.).
23 Id. at 1117 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting). Prior to Davis and J.E.B,
the Fifth Circuit held Batson applicable to religion. See United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d
1076, 1086 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1991). Courts in a number of states have relied on their state
constitution or state statutes, rather than Batson, as authority for barring religion-based
peremptory challenges. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62 (Cal. 1978); Fields v.
People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1154 n.15 (Colo. 1987);Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777, 781 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 850 (Haw. 1990); Commonwealth v,
Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516 (Mass. 1979); Thorson v. State, 90-DP-00015-SCT, 8, 721 So.
2d 590, 594 (Miss. 1998); State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1159 & n.3 (N.J. 1986); People v.
Langston, 641 N.Y.S.2d 513, 514 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
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indicate agreement with the opinion below holding Batson
inapplicable.2 4
In holding Batson inapplicable, the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Davis proceeded on the view that religious minorities have not exper-
ienced the type of discrimination in eligibility and selection for jury
service that racial minorities have experienced.5 Maintaining that
this history of discrimination was crucial to the Court's reasoning in
according special treatment to race in Batson,26 the Minnesota high
court concluded that Batson is not authority for giving special treat-
ment to religion.2 7
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Casarez v. Stat - also
held Batson inapplicable to religion-based peremptories but did so pri-
marily on the theory that discrimination on the basis of religion has a
reasonableness and legitimacy with regard to peremptory challenges
that discrimination on the basis of race lacks. Batson denied that one
could fairly infer from a veniremember's race that the veniremember
holds certain beliefs that render him or her unsuitable for jury ser-
vice.2 9 In distinguishing Batson, the Casarez court maintained that the
same cannot be said for inferences based on the veniremember's re-
ligion.30 As the court explained, "If it is permissible to discriminate
against prospective jurors on account of their beliefs, then it is neces-
sarily permissible to discriminate against them on account of their re-
ligion, for discrimination on the basis of religion is discrimination on
the basis of belief."3 '
B. Some Welcome Clarification from the Religion Clauses
However persuasive or unpersuasive these efforts to distinguish
Batson and its equal protection analysis may be, the First Amend-
ment's Religion Clauses provide an independent basis for questioning
the legitimacy of religion-based peremptory challenges. Moreover,
their lesson is strikingly clear: Religion-based peremptories are in-
24 See Davis, 511 U.S. at 1115-16 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
25 State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) ("[R]eligious bigotry in the use of
the peremptory challenge is not as prevalent, or flagrant, or historically ingrained in the
jury selection process as is race ...
26 Id at 770-71.
27 Id at 771. For the view that "our nation's history of religious discrimination, espe-
cially in the jury system, suggests that courts should review religion-based challenges under
heightened scrutiny," see Amy B. Gendleman, Note, The Equal Protection Cause, the FRe
Exerdse Clause and Religion-Based Peremptog Challenges, 63 U. Ciii. L R x. 1639, 1653-55
(1996).
28 913 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Grim. App. 1994).
29 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
30 Casarz, 913 S.W.2d at 496 ("Because all members of the group share the same faith
by definition, it is not unjust to attribute beliefs characteristic of the faith to all of them.).
31 Id. at 495-96. For criticism of this step in the coures reasoning as "fundamentally
flawed," see id. at 499-501 (Baird, J., dissenting).
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compatible with basic principles underlying both Clauses and should
be banned.
1. The Free Exercise Clause
In recent years a debate has raged on and off the Supreme Court
as to whether the Free Exercise Clause authorizes courts to carve out
exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws on behalf of indi-
viduals whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by such
laws.32 As of 1963, if not earlier, the Court interpreted the Clause as
requiring courts to grant exemptions to such claimants unless the
state could show that denying the exemption was necessary to serve a
compelling state interest.33 However, in 1990, a 5-4 majority of the
Court in Employment Division v. Smith34 held that, with limited excep-
tion,3 5 the Clause requires no such thing. As long as laws are religion-
neutral on their face and apply broadly to secular as well as religious
activities, they are generally immune under Smith from free exercise
attack.3 6 Responding to intensive and broad-based lobbying efforts3 7
and relying for authority upon Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,3 8 a virtually unanimous Congress in 1993 passed legislation de-
signed to restore the pre-Smith interpretation of the Clause."9
However, holding that the law exceeded the scope of Congress's Sec-
tion 5 powers, the Court in 1997 returned Smith and its controversial
no-exemption principle to center stage.40
32 For a sampling of the literature on this issue, see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Law-
rence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious
Conduct, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 1245 (1994); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free IExercise,
1990 Sup. CT. Rxv. 1; William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism,
58 U. CHi. L. REV. 308 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Under-
standing of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
33 See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987)
("[I]nfringements [upon free exercise] must be subjected to strict scrutiny and [can] be
justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215 (1972) ("[Oinly those interests of the highest order and those not othenvise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (requiring "compelling state interest" in order to justify
.substantial infringement of [a] First Amendment right").
34 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
35 The Court allowed for court-ordered exemptions with a few types of claims, includ-
ing "hybrid" claims-ones involving "the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections," id. at 881-82-and unemployment compensation claims, id. at
883-84.
36 See id. at 878-80.
37 See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 Foan-
HAM L. REv. 883, 895-96 (1994); David E. Anderson, Signing of Religious Freedom Act
Culminates 3-Year Push, WASH. PosT, Nov. 20, 1993, at C6.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
39 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)).
40 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Religion-based peremptory challenges strike so close to the core
of the Free Exercise Clause that Justices and others on both sides of
the heated Smith debate should readily be able to agree that such chal-
lenges violate the Clause. Unlike the laws that are the focus of the
Smith debate, religion-based peremptory challenges are laws-i.e., gov-
ernmental action-that are neither neutral nor generally applicable:
they discriminate by their own terms against adherents of a particular
religion; and they are limited in applicability to religious adherents. 4'
Moreover, unlike the religious liberty claims that so divided the Jus-
tices in Smith, a claim seeking invalidation of religion-based perempto-
ries would not be one to secure a court-ordered religion-based
exemption from a law that concededly applies validly in the great ma-
jority of cases.
Rather than the controversial Smith question, such claims would
be raising the "fundamental nonpersecution principle"42 that three
years after Smith produced a unanimous Supreme Court invalidation
of a Florida city's ordinances "targeting"43 the Santeria religion for
disadvantage. In that case, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, the Court recognized that "[a]t a minimum, the protections
of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates
against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct
because it is undertaken for religious reasons."44 Concluding that Hi-
aleah's ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice had the purpose and
effect of singling out Santeria sacrifice for adverse treatment, the
Court held the ordinances to "strict scrutiny 45 -the demanding nec-
essary-to-a-compelling-interest test-and found them sorely lacking.46
Like the Hialeah ordinances, religion-based peremptory chal-
lenges have as their purpose and effect the adverse treatment of a
particular religion. While the Hialeah ordinances prohibited adher-
41 The Supreme Court has not firmly resolved the meaning of "religion," as used in
the First Amendment. In 1890 the Court explained that the term "has reference to one's
views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his
being and character, and of obedience to his will." Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342
(1890). In Torcaso v. Watkins 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the Court abandoned that definition as
unduly narrow, stating that under the First Amendment government cannot "aid those
religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on
different beliefs." Id. at 495. The Court in Torcaso, however, avoided committing itself
explicitly to a new definition, and it has continued to avoid such a commitment. For a
variety of scholarly efforts to resolve the issue, see Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the
First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. Rrv. 579; Kent Greenau-alt, Religion as a Concept in Constitu-
tional Law, 72 GL. L REv. 753 (1984); Gail Merel, The Protection of hididual CLaire: A
Consistent Understanding of Rdigion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L RE%. 805 (1978).
42 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523 (1993).
43 Id. at 533.
44 Id at 532.
45 Id. at 546.
46 Id. at 546-47.
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ents of the Santeria religion from engaging in a central religious prac-
tice, religion-based peremptories prohibit veniremembers of the
targeted religion from engaging in a basic privilege of citizenship. 17
Also like the Hialeah ordinances, religion-based peremptories do
not arguably survive strict scrutiny. They do serve to some extent an
interest-securing a fair and impartial jury-that, particularly by vir-
tue of its Sixth Amendment underpinnings,48 can reasonably be char-
acterized as "compelling." They are hardly necessary, however, to
serve this interest.
Most obviously, religion-based peremptories are grossly overinclu-
sive as a means of achieving this end. They proceed on the assump-
tion that, as members of a particular religion, the challenged
veniremembers hold certain beliefs that undermine their ability to be
fair and impartial jurors. The inference, though, from a person's
membership in a particular religion to his or her adherence to the
various tenets of that religion is highly attenuated. Many people
count themselves as members of a religion more because they were
raised within that tradition than because they currently follow its
precepts with great attention and devotion. In addition, even fairly
devout practitioners of a religion are frequently unaware of, or do not
subscribe to, certain official tenets of the religion. More broadly, the
entire enterprise of lawyers' reasoning from the official tenets of a
religion to a particular individual's beliefs is fraught with uncertainty
and imprecision because those tenets are often more ambiguous and
complex than a layperson-particularly, as is often the case with per-
emptories, a layperson not belonging to that religion-is apt to
comprehend. 49
Ultimately, rather than allow the parties to use religion-based per-
emptories to weed out veniremembers who hold certain beliefs that
47 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) ("Jury service is an exercise of respon.
sible citizenship by all members of the community, including those who otherwise might
not have the opportunity to contribute to our civic life."); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S.
298, 310 (1922) ("One of [the] greatest benefits [of the jury system] is in the security it
gives the people that they, as jurors actual or possible, being part of the judicial system of'
the country can prevent its arbitrary use or abuse."); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 308 (1880) (characterizing jury service as the "privilege of participating... in the
administration ofjustice").
48 See U.S. CONsr. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... .").
49 A prosecutor's note to the trial court explaining, in response to a Batson challenge,
his race-neutral reasons for exercising a peremptory epitomizes the point:
This juror is a Jehovah's Witness. The prosecutor has been informed, al-
though he does not know for certain, that this religious denomination does
not believe in the death penalty, If so, there is a danger that this juror's
religious beliefs would interfere with her ability to deliberate as to
punishment.
State v. Eason, 445 S.E.2d 917, 922 (N.G. 1994).
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cast doubt on their ability to serve fairly and impartially, courts should
require the parties to use their peremptories to excuse only
veniremembers who actually hold such beliefs. 50 Thus, for example, it
is not enough simply to assume, as some prosecutors have done in
exercising peremptories, that because a veniremember is aJehovah's
Witness he or she is strongly opposed to the death penalty.5 1' To jus-
tify using a peremptory to excuse such a veniremember, the state must
be able to establish on voir dire or by other means that the
veniremember indeed holds such a belief. The "fundamental nonper-
secution principle" recognized in Lukumi as central to the Free Exer-
cise Clause 52 demands no less. It places peremptories based on
religious stereotypes out of bounds.
This interpretation of free exercise constraints has several impli-
cations that may warrant further explanation. First, it should be em-
phasized that, under this interpretation, peremptory challenges
continue to serve an important function beyond that served by chal-
lenges for cause. Consider, for example, their utility with regard to
veniremembers who state that, for religious reasons, they have per-
sonal reservations about the death penalty. Such veniremembers can-
not be successfully challenged for cause unless they also admit, or it
can be shown, that they are apt to be unable to apply the state's death
penalty scheme with reasonable objectivity. A prosecutor is free to use
peremptories to strike them, however, based simply on a suspicion
that their personal views would skew their application of the penalty
scheme.
Second, while it is entirely appropriate for the parties to use voir
dire to identify, and peremptories to eliminate, veniremembers who
hold religiously based beliefs that cast doubt on their ability to serve
fairly and impartially, the parties cannot simply take aim at
veniremembers who hold such beliefs for religious reasons. They
must also seek to root out veniremembers who hold the same basic
50 As indicated by our statement in the text, we believe, along with tie Court in Geor-
gia v. McCollur, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), that constitutional constraints are triggered by de-
fense, as well as prosecution, use of peremptories. In essence, although criminal
defendants are private actors, their use of peremptory challenges is "state action" because
they are exercising decisionmaking authority delegated by the government As the Court
explained in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), a decision repeatedly
cited in McCoUum for its analysis in holding that the use of peremptories by a private civil
defendant is state action:
Were it not for peremptory challenges, there would be no question that the
entire process of determining who will serve on the jury constitutes state
action. The fact that the government delegates some portion of this power
to private litigants does not change the governmental character of the
power exercised.
Id at 626.
51 See, eg., State v. Davis, 504 N.V.2d 767, 768 (Minn. 1993); Bason, 445 S.E.2d at 922.
52 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 523.
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beliefs for secular reasons. To do otherwise would run afoul of the
Lukumi prohibition on targeting people for adverse treatment based
on religion. Thus, for example, if the state is intent on rooting out all
veniremembers whose personal reservations about the death penalty
might sway their decision, it cannot press onlyJehovah's Witnesses on
this matter on voir dire and exercise peremptories only against them
for personal reservations about the death penalty. It must apply simi-
lar scrutiny and exercise peremptories in similar fashion to the other
members of the jury pool.
Third, free exercise bars not only peremptories based solely on
the veniremember's religion but also ones based partly on it. The key
is nondiscrimination on the basis of religion, and such discrimination
occurs if a veniremember's religion is counted as a reason for exercis-
ing a peremptory. In analyzing race- and gender-based peremptories
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has appeared
to predicate invalidation on a showing that race or gender was the sole
basis for exercising the peremptory.53 Whether or not such a require-
ment is a sound application of equal protection principles, it has no
place in free exercise law.
Fourth and lastly, it may be useful to clarify the implications of
our free exercise analysis for a peremptory challenge based on the
assumption that a veniremember will be biased in favor of a defen-
dant, victim, or witness who shares the veniremember's religion. 1 As
Batson made clear for race,55 such stereotypical assumptions of bias in
favor of coreligionists have no legitimate place in this nation's judicial
system, and peremptories cannot legitimately be exercised on the ba-
sis of such assumptions. A party remains free, of course, to ask indi-
vidual veniremembers whether they harbor and are apt to act on a
bias in favor of coreligionists. However, questions of this sort are so
obviously insulting and antagonistic that, absent some particularized
reasons to suspect such bias, it is difficult to imagine the parties asking
them.
53 See, e.g.,J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) ("Our conclusion that litigants
may not strike potential jurors solely on the basis of gender does not imply the elimination
of all peremptory challenges." (emphasis added)); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89
(1986) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential ju-
rors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that blackjurors as a group will be
unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant." (emphasis
added)).
54 See, e.g., Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 951, 953-54 (D.C. 1977) (upholding
denial of defense motion to exclude all Catholics from jury based on Catholic jurors' al-
leged inability to gauge fairly the credibility of testimony by victims who were Catholic
priests); Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1994) (holding that trial
court erred in allowing prosecution to exercise peremptory challenge against Jewish
veniremember based on her presumed identification with Jewish defendant).
55 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98.
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In keeping, then, with the "fundamental nonpersecution princi-
ple" invoked in Lukum45 6 religion-based peremptories should be held
to violate the Free Exercise Clause. Indeed, religion-based perempto-
ties may well pose an even easier case for invalidation than the Florida
ordinances that the Court unanimously struck down in Lukumi. A
strong argument can be made that religion-based peremptories fall
under a principle that the Court in Lukumi articulated but regarded as
inapplicable: "a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permis-
sible."57 Such a law need not be tested by the necessary-to-a-compel-
ling-interest standard applied to laws targeting religious conduct. It is
invalid without more.58 Forty years ago, the Court in Torcaso v. Wat-
kins59 invoked this principle in striking down a Maryland constitu-
tional provision barring from public office any person unwilling to
declare a belief in God, and religion-based peremptories function in
very much the same way as the invalidated Maryland law.60
Concededly, the Court is slow to find that a law targets religious
belief and therefore is instantly invalid.61 Instead, as in Lukumi, it typi-
cally finds that the law regulates conduct and therefore is not invalid
unless unable to survive the necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test.
Religion-based peremptories so boldly target beliefs, however, that the
conclusion that they regulate belief rather than conduct is difficult to
avoid.
In any event, even if the Court in deciding the validity of religion-
based peremptories under the Free Exercise Clause were to treat the
56 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 523.
57 Id. at 533.
58 See id; see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (plurality opinion) ('If
the Tennessee disqualification provision were viewed as depriving the clergy of a civil right
solely because of their religious beliefs, our inquiry would be at an end. The Free Exercise
Clause categorically prohibits government from regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding relig-
ious beliefs as such."); id. at 635 & n.8 (Brennan,J., concurring injudgment) (maintaining
that the law under review interferes with freedom of belief and therefore "requires no
balancing of interests" and "is void ithout more").
59 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
60 In Torcaso the appellant also claimed that the Maryland law violated the Constitu-
tion's provision barring religious tests. See U.S. Coi'sr. art. VI (oNo religious Test shall
ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States."). Invalidating the law on First Amendment grounds, the Court did not attempt to
resolve the claim and expressly declined "to consider appellant's contention that this provi-
sion applies to state as well as federal offices." Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489 n.1. A forceful
argument could be made that religion-based peremptories in federal court violate the pro-
vision, but the language of Article VI-in particular, "under the United States"-rather
clearly makes it inapplicable to religion-based peremptories in state court.
61 The debate among the justices in McDanid v. Pay, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), as well as
the absence of a majority in that case for the proposition that the law under review regu-
lated belief, illuminate the point well. The law, which the Court struck down by an 8-0
vote, was a Tennessee statute prohibiting any "Minister of the Gospel, or priest of any
denomination whatever" from serving as a delegate to Tennessee's 1977 limited constitu-
tional convention. Id. at 621 n.l.
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conduct-targeting principle of Lukumi, rather than the belief-targeting
principle of Torcaso, as controlling, it could not help but be swayed in
its thinking about the issue by the strong resemblance to Torcaso. As a
result, it should at the very least find this an easy case for invalidation
under the necessary-to-a-compelling-interest test.
2. The Establishment Clause
Like the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause has been
a source of considerable doctrinal turmoil in recent years. Most nota-
bly, the three-prong purpose-effect-entanglement test 62 that the Su-
preme Court announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman6 3 in 1971 has come
under increasing attack by members of the Court. 64 Although the
Court has never formally abandoned the test, it has made clear on a
number of occasions its unwillingness to be bound strictly by the
test.65 A majority of the Court is committed to the principle, implicit
in the Lemon test, that the government may not adopt laws for the
purpose, or with the primary effect, of endorsing religion. 66 Four of
the currentJustices, however, have indicated their discontent with this
"endorsement test" and their preference for an interpretation of the
Establishment Clause that would predicate a finding of violation of
the Clause on a showing of coercion. 67
62 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.'" (citations omitted)).
63 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
64 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing various
Justices' opinions criticizing the Lemon test). Various commentators have called for aban-
doning the test. See, e.g., Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment
ReligiousDoctrine, 72 CAL. L. REv. 817 (1984); Phillip B. Kurland, TheIrrelevance of the Consti-
tution: Tlw Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. Mw. "a
(1978).
65 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (treating entanglement inquiry
"as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect"); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) (emphasizing "neutrality towards religion" rather
than Lemon test in holding that Establishment Clause does not bar state university from
giving student publication with religious themes the same access as secular student publica-
tions to student activities fund). For a defense of various aspects of the Lemon test and a
proposed reformulation, see GaryJ. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Suprene Court:
Rethinking the Court's Approach 72 CORNELL L. REv. 905 (1987).
66 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995);
Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). See generally Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking
Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential
ofJustice O'Connor'sInsigh 64 N.C. L. R-v. 1049 (1986) (discussing nonendorsement prin-
ciple); William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court and Establish-
ment, 59 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 495 (1986) (same).
67 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 640-44 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ. & White & Thomas,
JJ., dissenting); Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 659-63, 668-79 (Kennedy, J,, joined by Rehn-
quist, CJ. & White & Scalia, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Kennedy's willingness to join the majority opinion in Santa Fe Independent School
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Religion-based peremptories clash with the Court's endorsement
test, which bars government from sending messages of approval or
disapproval of religion.68 Since religion-based peremptories serve to
some extent the purpose of securing a fair and impartial jury, they
survive the test's purpose prong, which calls for invalidation only if the
law under review is shown to rest entirely or almost entirely on a pur-
pose of endorsing religion. 69 The effect prong of the test, however,
presents a hurdle that religion-based peremptories cannot overcome.
That prong essentially asks whether a reasonable observer familiar
with the history and context of the challenged government action is
likely to view that action as sending a message of state approval or
disapproval of religion.70 Because religion-based peremptories rather
unambiguously characterize a particular religion's tenets as a threat to
the fair and impartial administration ofjustice, a reasonable observer
virtually cannot help but view the peremptories as sending a message
of state disapproval of religion.
As noted above, the endorsement test is a matter of some contro-
versy on today's Court. The incompatibility of religion-based per-
emptories with the Establishment Clause, however, does not rest on
the endorsement test alone. With the Establishment Clause, as with
the Free Exercise Clause, religion-based peremptories strike so close
to the core of the Clause that Justices on both sides of the current
areas of interpretive debate should have little difficulty agreeing that
such peremptories should not be allowed. Religion-based perempto-
ries entail what the Court has called a "denominational preference."7'
The Establishment Clause bars the government not only from estab-
lishing one religion as paramount but also from treating some reli-
gions better than others. As Justice Black wrote in Everson v. Board of
District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), is perhaps an indication that he is no longer as dissatis-
fied with the endorsement test as he was when he wrote in All gieny County. In inualidating
the school district's policy of allowing student-led and -initiated prayer at football games,
the Court found impermissible coercion but emphasized violation of the endorsement test.
For competing views on the validity of substituting a coercion test for the endorsement test,
see JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING REUGIOUs LIBEs' 97-159 (1995) (pro), and GaryJ. Simson,
Endangering Religious Liben, 84 Gm-. L REv. 441, 462-81 (1996) (con).
68 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 & n.42 (1985). For discussion of de func-
tional similarity for Establishment Clause purposes of messages of approval and disap-
proval of religion, see Simson, supra note 65, at 912.
69 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988) (stating that "a court may inali-
date a statute only if it is motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose"); Stone v. Gra-
ham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (stating that the "pre-eminent purpose" of a law must not be
"plainly religious in nature").
70 See, eg., Alleglny County, 492 U.S. at 592-94,599-600; lallace, 472 U.S. at 56 & n.42;
id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982).
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Education,72 the Court's seminal Establishment Clause decision hold-
ing the Clause applicable to the states:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another .... 73
By singling out a religion for disadvantage, religion-based perempto-
ries violate this nonpreferencing principle as surely as if they named
the preferred religions for advantage. Under controlling precedent,
such peremptories therefore must satisfy the necessary-to-a-compel-
ling-interest test in order to stand,74 and as discussed above in our free
exercise analysis, they do not remotely meet that test.75
II
PENALTY-PHASE EVIDENCE
In the penalty phase of capital cases, both the state and the de-
fense typically offer a wide range of evidence to persuade the jury to
take their side in voting for life or death. Religious evidence offered
falls into three general categories: evidence about the defendant's re-
ligiosity; evidence about the victim's religiosity; and evidence about
religious opinion of the death penalty. After discussing in section A
the current understanding of the constitutionality of admitting such
evidence, we suggest in section B that serious consideration of the Re-
ligion Clauses points to the need for substantial revision of that
understanding.
A. The Prevailing (Largely Eighth Amendment) Wisdom
1. The Defendant's Religiosity
Under the Supreme Court's decision in 1978 in Lockelt v. Ohio,76
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ment guarantees capital defendants the right to present a broad range
72 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
73 Id. at 15.
74 See Larson, 456 U.S. at 246-47.
75 We recognize that effective enforcement of a ban on religion-based peremptories
may face significant practical difficulties. Cf CharlesJ. Ogletree, Just Say No! A Proposal to
Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptoy Challenges, 31 A. Caur. L. REv. 1099, 1107(1994) ("[Iun manyjurisdictions .... Batson has been more or less undermined by prose-
cutors who fabricate facially neutral reasons for striking minority jurors, and trial courts
that have difficulty evaluating such reasons."). It is beyond the scope of this Article to
assess the seriousness of these possible difficulties or propose ways to overcome them.
76 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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of evidence in mitigation.77 Any mitigating evidence that they wish to
offer about their "character, prior record, or the circumstances of
[the] offense" cannot be excluded as irrelemantY78
In keeping with Locket4 the defense commonly introduces evi-
dence of the defendant's religiosity.7 9 Such evidence is generally in-
troduced to get the jury to see the defendant in a sympathetic light
and to persuade the jury that the defendant is not apt to cause serious
harm in the future.8 0 At times defendants offer evidence that religion
became an important part of their life for the first time in prison. t In
introducing such evidence defendants hope to convince the jury to
view them more positively even if their prior record does not inspire
sympathy or confidence.
Once a defendant has put his or her religiosity at issue, courts
ordinarily have given prosecutors quite a bit of latitude to turn the
issue against the defendant. In one case the defendant asserted at
trial that he had become very religious in prison, regularly reading
verses from the Bible and incorporating them into songs. The prose-
cutor was then permitted to ask him if he had ever read the verse
77 Id. at 602-05 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.); accord McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433, 441 (1990); mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1988); Hitchcock v.
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987).
78 Lockett; 438 U.S. at 604 & n.12. The Court has recognized that Lodctct's mandate of
individualization is in some conflict with the Court's independent mandate of nonarbitrari-
ness in capital sentencing. See eg., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994) (The
eligibility decision fits the crime within a defined classification.... The selection decision,
on the other hand, requires individualized sentencing .... The objectives of dmese two
inquiries can be in some tension." (citation omitted)). For different suggestions as to how
to deal with this tension, see, for example, Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from
Heaven"." Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 Com'a.L L RE%,. 989 (1996); Scott W. Howe, Resho-
ing the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulatlion, 26 CA.. L
REV. 323 (1992); Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and
Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L RE,. 1147 (1991).
79 See, eg., Lowe v. State, 650 So. 2d 969, 976 (Fla. 1994) ("participated in Bible stud-
ies"); Harmon v. State, 527 So. 2d 182, 189 (Fla. 1988) ("attended church regularly"); State
v. Wingo, 457 So. 2d 1159, 1164 (La. 1984) ("held basic Christian religious beliefs);
Bolder v. State, 769 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Mo. 1989) ("participat[ed] in religious activities"); State
v. Beuke, 526 N.E.2d 274, 289 (Ohio 1988) ("helped... serve mass"); State v. Poindexter,
520 N.E.2d 568, 574 (Ohio 1988) ("religious person").
80 SeeFranklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 186 (1988) (O'ConnorJ, concurring) ("Evi-
dence of ... religious devotion might demonstrate positive character traits that might
mitigate against the death penalty."); id. at 190 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that evi-
dence of regular church attendance "may suggest that the conduct of which the defendant
stands convicted was not in keeping with his or her usual qualities or traits, a fact that has
as much relevance to culpability as to future dangerousness").
81 See, e-g., People v. Whitt, 798 P.2d 849, 856 (Cal. 1990) (noting that defendant
offered testimony that he had become a "born-again Christian" while in prison aw%aiting
retrial); State x. Hill, 319 S.E.2d 163, 169 (N.C. 1984) (noting that "defendant put on
evidence that, while he was in jail awaiting trial, he had become a born-again Christian");
State v. Smith, 731 N.E.2d 645, 651 (Ohio 2000) (noting that defendant offered testimony
of an "Islamic jail counselor . . . to show [him] as a person who has now turned to
religion").
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"Thou shalt not kill."82 In another instance, where the defendant visi-
bly wore a cross throughout his trial and his mother had testified that
he wore a cross at times as a child, the prosecutor was allowed to pre-
sent police testimony that the defendant was not wearing a cross at the
time of arrest.83
Defendants who choose not to put their religiosity at issue can
generally rest assured that the prosecution cannot try to use their re-
ligion or lack thereof against them. The Supreme Court in Zant v.
Stephens8 4 stated as a basic proposition that the state cannot treat a
factor as aggravating if it is "constitutionally impermissible or totally
irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for example the race,
religion, or political affiliation of the defendant.85 More recently, the
Court in Dawson v. Delawares6 held that the First Amendment's protec-
tion of freedom of association prevents the state from impugning the
defendant's character by introducing evidence about the defendant's
membership in a particular group where "the evidence prove [s] noth-
ing more than [the defendant's] abstract beliefs."87
2. The Victim's Religiosity
In two decisions in the late 1980s, Booth v. MarylandA and South
Carolina v. Gathers,89 the Supreme Court by 5-4 votes established that
the Eighth Amendment bars the state at the penalty phase of capital
cases from introducing "victim impact" evidence-evidence about the
victim's personal characteristics or about the crime's effect on the vic-
tim's family. As the Court explained in Gathers-a case in which the
victim impact evidence at issue included evidence about the victim's
religiosity9 -the Eighth Amendment requires that "a sentence of
death must be related to the moral culpability of the defendant,"!l
and victim impact evidence "introduce[s] factors that might be
'wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular
defendant."' 92
82 Robinson v. State, 900 P.2d 389, 400 (Okla. Grim. App. 1995).
83 People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099, 1146, 1151-52 (Cal. 1993).
84 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
85 Id. at 885 (emphasis added); accord Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 382 (1985)
(quoting Zant).
86 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
87 Id. at 167. The Court in Dawson made clear that if the evidence of group member-
ship proves more than abstract beliefs, it is admissible. Thus, if the evidence genuinely
bears on an "aggravating circumstance," such as future dangerousness, the state is free to
introduce it. Id. at 166.
88 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled 4y Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
89 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
90 Gatliers, 490 U.S. at 808-10 (quoting prosecutor's closing argument).
91 Id. at 810.
92 Id. (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 504).
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Two years after Gathers and with the authors of the Court's opin-
ions in Booth and Gathers no longer on the Court, the Court in Payne v.
Tennessee93 did an about-face. The new 6-3 majority rejected the no-
tion that, under the Eighth Amendment, only evidence related to
blameworthiness is admissible at the penalty phase of capital cases.
Rather, in the Court's view, victim impact evidence should be allowed
because "the assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a result
of the crime charged has understandably been an important concern
of the criminal law."94 Though barred in Gathers, evidence about the
victim's religiosity therefore became freely admissible with Paiyne.97,
3. Religious Opinion About the Death Penalty
In seeking to persuade the jury not to vote for death, capital de-
fendants have tried to introduce evidence of religious opposition to
the death penalty. At times the defense has called members of the
clergy to the stand to testify that the death penalty violates the tenets
of their religion.96 On other occasions it has offered into evidence
reports documenting various religious groups' official positions
against the death penalty.97
Courts routinely reject such evidence as irrelevant to the decision
at hand. Though recognizing a capital defendant's broad Eighth
Amendment right under Lockett to introduce mitigating evidence, they
hold that evidence of this sort falls outside the scope of that right. As
the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in State v. Rose, "[e]vidence
proffered by a defendant at the penalty phase must be 'relevant to ...
[the] defendant's character or record, or to the circumstances of the
offense,'" and evidence regarding the "religious propriety" of the
death penalty "do[es] not address any of those issues."93
B. The View from the Religion Clauses
1. The Defendant's Religiosity
Evidence presented in mitigation about a capital defendant's re-
ligiosity frequently invites jurors to draw on stereotypical views of
93 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
94 Id. at 819. The Court in Payne made clear that it ias not addressing the question,
decided in the affirmative in Booth. whether "the admission of a victim's family members'
characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sen-
tence violates the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 830 n.2.
95 For a helpful survey of developments after Payne see Wa)ne A. Logan, Through the
Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim Inpart Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 Awnz.
L REv. 143 (1999).
96 EKg., Stanford v. Commomealth, 854 SAV.2d 742, 748 (Ky. 1993); State v. Rose, 576
A.2d 235, 236 (N.J. 1990).
97 E.g., Fleenor v. State, 514 N.E.2d 80, 87 (Ind. 1987).
98 Rose, 576 A.2d at 236 (quoting State v. Gerald, 549 A.2d 792, 825 (N.J. 1988)).
2001] 1107
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
membership in a widely shared religion (or in at least some religion) as
indicative of a person's inherent goodness and positive potential. The
question therefore arises whether the court in allowing the jury to
consider such evidence has an obligation under the Establishment
Clause to try to ensure that the jurors do not give the evidence undue
weight.99 We suggest that it does by virtue of the basic Establishment
Clause prohibition against favoring religion over nonreligion or one
religion over another.
The fact that the jury, rather than the court, would be doing the
favoring is inconsequential. Although the members of the jury are
private citizens for purposes other than their jury service, they should
be seen as state actors when serving as jurors because they are acting
pursuant to a delegation of authority from the state. Indeed, when
serving as jurors, they are paid employees of the state and comprise
what the Supreme Court has called "a governmental body."100
To try to ensure that jurors do not give evidence about the defen-
dant's religiosity more weight than it deserves, the court should in-
struct them that the defendant's religiosity or lack thereof is not the
issue and that religious observance cannot simply be equated with pos-
itive character traits. The key, jurors should be told, is the extent, if
any, to which the evidence about religiosity shows that the defendant
has internalized the moral values central to good character.10 1
Instructions of this sort do not limit the scope of what defendants
may offer into evidence under Lockett. As a practical matter, however,
by highlighting the superficiality of certain appeals to religion, such
instructions may discourage some capital defendants from raising
their religiosity as a mitigating factor. Thus, knowing that such in-
structions will follow, the defendant may not be as apt to try to stake a
claim for religiosity based on testimony that, for example, the defen-
dant attended church regularly until about ten years before the
99 This discussion assumes that the evidence admitted about religiosity meets the
usual standards of admissibility applied by the court. If the court were to apply a more
indulgent standard of admissibility to religious evidence presented in mitigation than to
nonreligious evidence, it would rather obviously be guilty of endorsing religion in violation
of the Establishment Clause.
100 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 626 (1991).
101 See Commonwealth v. Reid, 642 A.2d 453, 459-60 (Pa. 1994) (recognizing that
"moral values held by one who is religious could be relevant to the character of a defen-
dant" and treating as critical whether defendant, who claimed he was prejudiced in the
sentencing hearing by limits placed on his presentation of evidence about a recent relig.
ious conversion, had had adequate opportunity to show a "change in moral values"); cf.
People v. Whitt, 798 P.2d 849, 856 (Cal. 1990) (discussing inmates' testimony about
"changes in defendant's behavior" since joining an inmate prayer group, including that
"defendant shows 'compassion' towards fellow inmates by 'shar~ing]' his few material pos-
sessions and 'counsel[ing]' others to avoid crime").
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crime,10 2 or wore a cross as a child,103 or as a youth helped serve
mass,' 0 4 or is simply a "religious" person, though belonging to no
church. 0 5
While the Establishment Clause places some constraints on capi-
tal defendants' ability to argue their religiosity as a mitigating factor,
the Free Exercise Clause sharply limits the state's ability to raise this
issue as an aggravating factor. In essence, the Free Exercise Clause
provides an alternative rationale for the holdings in Zant and Dawson.
The prohibition on targeting religious exercise for disadvantage that
the Court has characterized as central to the Free Exercise Clause'06
would be violated by any attempt to argue that the defendant should
be treated less favorably based on the fact that he or she adheres to a
particular religion or to no religion at all. This prohibition on target-
ing, however, does not prevent the state from treating as evidence of
bad character certain moral beliefs that the defendant may hold for
religious reasons as long as the state treats such beliefs as equally prob-
lematic if held for nonreligious reasons.
2. The Victim's Religiosity
Under Payne v. Tennessee,10 7 states may choose, as a policy matter,
to allow evidence about the victim that will give the jury "'a quick
glimpse of the life' which a defendant 'chose to extinguish.'""0 Al-
though evidence about the victim's religiosity may help give the jury
such a glimpse, it is also rife with Establishment Clause difficulties.
Like evidence presented in mitigation about a defendant's religiosity,
it commonly invites jurors to draw on stereotypes equating religious
adherence, particularly as to widely shared religions, with inherent
personal goodness and positive potential.
The Court in Payne emphasized that the purpose of allowing evi-
dence about the victim is not to enable the jury to rank victims as
more or less important to society and worthy to live.' 9 Nonetheless,
the danger thatjuries might use evidence about the victim's religiosity
to make such judgments cannot be denied. A possible solution is for
courts to give a limiting instruction telling the jury both that it should
not assume that religious adherence makes the victim a better person
102 See Harmon v. State, 527 So. 2d 182, 189 (Fla. 1988).
103 See People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099, 1146 (Cal. 1993).
104 See State v. Beuke, 526 N.E.2d 274, 289 (Ohio 1988).
105 SeeJackson v. Dugger, 529 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Fla. 1988).
106 See supra text accompanying notes 42.46.
107 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
108 Id. at 822 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, CJ.,
dissenting)).
109 See id. at 823 ("[Vlictim impact evidence is not offered to encourage comparative
judgments.").
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and that its job in any event is not to set the penalty based on its
assessment of the relative value of the victim's life. Given, however,
the danger that the jury will give this evidence undue weight and (un-
like the situation with evidence of defendants' religiosity) the absence
of any constitutional imperative for allowing in evidence of this sort,
the constitutionally preferred approach under the Establishment
Clause would appear to be otherwise. Instead, courts should exclude
evidence of the victim's religiosity unless religion was so central a part
of the victim's life that to omit mention of it would provide a false
"'glimpse of the [victim's] life."' 0 The limiting-instruction approach
should be reserved for those rare occasions in which evidence of the
victim's religiosity could not sensibly be excluded.
3. Religious Opinion About the Death Penalty
The Establishment Clause confirms the correctness of decisions
that courts regularly have reached on grounds of relevance when
faced with attempts by defendants to introduce evidence of religious
opposition to the death penalty. While courts have barred such evi-
dence as irrelevant under Lockett's conception of relevance, they
mightjust as well have invoked the Establishment Clause as a bar. For
courts to allow juries to entertain such evidence as a basis for rejecting
the legislature's decision that a particular offense may be punishable
by death would be the epitome of government endorsement of
religion.
III
CLOSING ARGUMENT
Particularly at the penalty phase, it is not uncommon in capital
cases for the prosecution or defense or both to invoke religion in clos-
ing arguments. The Bible is a favorite source for both sides. While
prosecutors never seem to tire of seizing upon the famous "an eye for
an eye, a tooth for a tooth" passage to exhort the jury to sentence to
death,"' defense attorneys have argued against death by drawing on
passages such as those recounting God's choice of penalties less than
death to punish Cain for killing his brother Abel."12
Objections at trial and on appeal to closing arguments of this sort
are typically framed in terms of the Due Process Clause or state-law
constraints affording similar protection against remarks prejudicial to
11o Id. at 822.
111 For analysis of one instance in which the prosecutor invoked this passage from
Genesis 9:6 and citation to others, see People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 692-93 & n.6 (Cal. 1998).
112 See, e.g., People v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 544, 579-80 (Cal. 1997) (recounting defense
counsel's reliance on the passages on Cain and Abel in Genesis 4:1-16).
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the proceedings."13 As discussed in section A below, courts in address-
ing such objections rarely find that any possible prejudice resulting
from the arguments rises to the level warranting a mistrial or reversal.
We suggest in section B that if objections to religious appeals in clos-
ing arguments were framed in terms of the Establishment Clause and
its nonendorsement principle, courts would be obliged to give the ob-
jections substantially more force.
A. The Standard Focus on Prejudice
When faced with due process or analogous state-law objections to
religiously based dosing arguments, courts vary considerably in the
types of arguments that they regard as problematic and potentially
prejudicial. The North Carolina Supreme Court, for example, has in-
dicated that it is not particularly troubled by prosecutorial uses of re-
ligion in closing argument as long as the prosecutor does not go so far
as to argue that "the state law or its officers were divinely inspired."" 4
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court has drawn die line of impropri-
ety at whether the prosecutor stopped short of "directly quoting relig-
ious authority as mandating a death sentence."'I If the prosecutor
does no more than offer "references to principles of divine law," the
Georgia high court is unconcerned." 6 By contrast, the California Su-
preme Court has taken the view that it is inappropriate to "invoke
higher or other law as a consideration in the jury's sentencing deter-
mination," 1 7 and the Tennessee courts have recognized that it is im-
proper to make "Biblical and scriptural references" during closing
argument." 8
Despite these differences among courts in the types of religiously
based closing arguments that they see as improper, the courts are re-
markably consistent in the way in which they ultimately dispose of ob-
jections to such arguments. With rare exception, when courts turn to
the question of whether the argument calls for a mistrial or reversal,
they conclude that it does not. Even if the court recognizes that the
argument is the sort that tends to have some prejudicial effect, it al-
113 The Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor's comments require reversal if they
"so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting coniction a denial of due
process." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974); see also Darden %. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnely).
114 State v. Sidden, 491 S.E.2d 225, 231 (N.C. 1997).
115 Carruthers v. State, 528 S.E.2d 217, 222 (Ga. 2000); atcord Greene V. State, 469
S.E.2d 129, 141 (Ga. 1996).
116 Greene 469 S.E.2d at 141.
17 People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 883 (Cal. 1992).
118 State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550, 559 (Tenn. 1999).
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most always denies that the objecting party has shown a sufficient like-
lihood of effect on the outcome to justify relief.1 9
The Pennsylvania courts stand as a notable exception because the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted a rule that "reliance in any
manner upon the Bible or any other religious writing in support of
the imposition of a penalty of death is reversible error per se and may
subject violators to disciplinary action."1 20 Outside of Pennsylvania,
however, courts almost invariably can be expected to conclude that, in
light of one or more factors such as the nonreligious tenor of the rest
of the closing argument, the weight of the evidence in favor of the
verdict, and appeals to religion by the other side, the requisite show-
ing of prejudice has not been met.12'
B. Taking Endorsement Seriously
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Establishment Clause as mandating an "endorsement test" that pro-
hibits governmental action taken for the purpose, or having the pri-
mary effect, of endorsing religion. 122 It is highly unlikely that the
governmental action represented by religiously based closing argu-
ments can ever be successfully challenged under the endorsement
test's purpose prong. Although such arguments may be motivated in
part by a purpose of endorsing religion, they are also obviously moti-
vated in substantial part by a purpose of securing a particular result at
trial; and the purpose prong is only violated if the challenged govern-
mental action can be proven to rest entirely or almost entirely on a
purpose of endorsing religion.
It is frequently possible, however, to mount a strong challenge to
religiously based closing arguments under the effect prong of the en-
dorsement test, which essentially asks whether a reasonable observer
acquainted with the history and context of the challenged governmen-
tal action is likely to view that action as sending a message of state
119 See, e.g., Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319, 328-29 (4th Cir. 1998) (concluding that
improper prosecutorial argument, which included "certain biblical quotations and refer-
ences," "did not deprive [the defendant] of a fair trial"); Sandoval 841 P.2d at 884; Mid-
dlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d at 560.
120 Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (Pa. 1991).
121 See, e.g., People v. Wash, 861 P.2d 1107, 1136 (Cal. 1993) (emphasizing that after
the improper religious references, the prosecutor "embarked upon a lengthy and detailed
argument devoted exclusively to the evidence in aggravation" and "did not return to the
subject of God or religion"); Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d at 560 (declining to reverse verdict in
light of "overwhelming" evidence in support of the jury's verdict despite concluding that
prosecutor's misconduct was "either intentional or alarmingly uninformed").
122 See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. For a detailed application of the
endorsement test in a different context from the one at hand, see GaryJ. Simson & Erika
A. Sussman, Keeping the Sex in Sex Education: The First Amendment's Religion Clauses and the Sex
Education Debate, 9 S. CaL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 265, 283997 (2000).
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endorsement of religion. Indeed, as illustrated below in subsection 1,
it is rare that religiously based closing arguments do not violate the
effect prong. As discussed in subsection 2, a determination that such
an argument violates the effect prong would not always require a mis-
trial or reversal, but even when it would not, it would have considera-
ble practical importance.
For the endorsement test to apply there must be governmental ac-
tion of some sort that may be understood as sending a message of
government endorsement of religion. When the prosecutor, a gov-
ernmental actor, makes religiously based closing arguments, this re-
quirement is obviously met. When the defense attorney, a private
actor, makes such arguments, the requisite governmental action is not
so apparent. We suggest, however, that it is present in that context as
well. 123 Although the defense attorney is not a governmental actor,
the court is. By permitting defense counsel to make religiously based
closing arguments, the court does not align itself with such arguments
in the sense of signaling that it finds the particular arguments persua-
sive. It does align itself with them, though, in the sense of affirming
that arguments of that type are valid and have a place in its courtroom.
Recognizing the court's broad control over what may be said in the
courtroom over which it so visibly presides, the reasonable observer
would understand the defense counsel's religious arguments as bear-
ing the court's tacit approval as legitimate arguments to make and
would attribute any message of endorsement not to the defense coun-
sel alone but to the court as well.'2 4
123 For state cases treating alike defense and prosecutorial use of religion in closing
argument, see Sandov4, 841 P.2d at 883 (Cal. 1992) ("Penalty determinations are to be
based on the evidence presented by the parties and the legal instructions given by the
court. Reference by either party to religious doctrine, commandments or biblical passages
tending to undermine that principle is improper."); State v. Patterson, 482 S.E.2d 760, 766
(S.C. 1997) (upholding trial court ruling sustaining prosecutorial objection to defense use
of religious argument). But seeJohn H. Blume & Sheri L)nn Johnson, Don't Take His Eye,
Don't Take His Tooth, and Don't Cast the First Stone: Limiting Religious Arguntts in Capital
Cases, 9 WNNt. & MA.RY BiLL RTs.J. 61, 98-104 (2000) (maintaining that closing argument by
defense counsel should be subject to fewer constraints than prosecutorial argument).
124 It is hardly novel to suggest that private speech in a government forum, which a
courtroom obviously is, may send a message of government endorsement of religion. For
example, in Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), the Court held that a creche
display placed in a county courthouse by a Roman Catholic group had the effect of com-
municating such a message. As the Court explained-
[N]ot all proclamations of Christian faith located on government property
are permitted by the Establishment Clause just because they occur during
the Christmas holiday season .... And once the judgment has been made
that a particular proclamation of Christian belief, when disseminated from
a particular location on government property, has the effect of demonstrat-
ing the government's endorsement of Christian faith, then it necessarily
follows that the practice must be enjoined to protect the constitutional
rights of those citizens who follow some creed other than Christianity.
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1. Application of the Test
Religion is used in a number of different ways in closing argu-
ments, and the endorsement analysis varies accordingly. Most obvi-
ously problematic in endorsement terms are instances in which the
Bible or another religious source is invoked as an independent basis
for jury decisionmaking-a basis for decision without regard to the
dictates of state law. In State v. Sidden,125 for example, the prosecutor
argued that in deciding the penalty for a defendant found guilty of
murdering two boys, the jury should not let any perceived mitigating
circumstances stand in the way of a sentence of death because the
Bible is clear on the matter. Invoking a passage from the New Testa-
ment-"'It were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his
neck and he cast into the sea than that he should offend one of these
little ones"' 12 6-the prosecutor urged the jury to do "what's right and
what's just, that you take a millstone and you hang it around his neck
and you cast it right into the sea for having offended these little
ones."
127
In upholding a death sentence in Sidden, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court made no mention of possible Establishment Clause diffi-
culties raised by the prosecutor's remarks.1 28 Such difficulties,
however, were enormous. The remarks sent an unmistakable message
of state endorsement of religion. They communicated in no uncer-
tain terms that the state regards biblical commands as taking prece-
dence over the framework of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances established by state law.
Another North Carolina case, State v. Laws,129 exemplifies a more
modest use of religion. In his closing argument urging a death sen-
tence, the prosecutor in that case maintained:
There are two kinds of law: there's God's law and there's man's law.
We're trying to sit here and do what's right by man's law, and yet
Id. at 612. In Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995),Justice
Scalia maintained in his plurality opinion that the endorsement test only applies to "ex-
pression by the government itself or else government action alleged to discriminate in favor of
private religious expression or activity." Id. at 764 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.,joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.) (citations omitted). A majority of tie
Court, however, rejected this narrow view of the test and reaffirmed the approach to pri-
vate speech in government forums taken in Allegheny County and other cases. Id. at 773-78
(O'Connor, J., joined by Souter and Breyer, IJ., concurring in judgment); id. at 799-800
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
125 491 S.E.2d 225 (N.C. 1997).
126 Id. at 231 (quoting Luke 17:2).
127 Id.
128 The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the remarks were not sufficiently
improper to call for reversal. See id. In so holding, the Court did not make clear its analyti-
cal framework, but it appeared to be approaching the issue from a type of due process or
fundamental fairness perspective.
129 381 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1989).
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man's law is based on God's law, one of the commandments being,
"Thou shalt not kill." This man has killed his fellow man.
As in Sidden, the North Carolina high court upheld a death sentence
with no attention to possible Establishment Clause problems. 31 Also
as in Sidden, an endorsement analysis points to an Establishment
Clause violation.
Any argument to the jury that, like the prosecutor's in Laws, in-
vokes the Bible or other religious source as legitimating and com-
manding respect for the state's laws sends a message of state support
of religion. Unlike the argument in Sidden, an argument of this sort
does not tell the jurors to ignore the state's laws and follow the dic-
tates of religion. It does tell them, however, that religion is the ulti-
mate measure of the validity of state law. Though not as obviously
prejudicial to the proceedings as the type of remark in Sidden-a mat-
ter to which we will return 13 2-remarks like the prosecutor's in Laws
have the plain effect of endorsing religion.
Another way in which religion is used in closing arguments is to
assure jurors that they would not be violating their religious beliefs by
reaching a particular verdict. In People v. Bradford,133 for example, the
prosecutor explained that "just in case any of you feel you're going
against any religious tenets," she would offer various "ideas about the
way the Bible feels about the death penalty." 3 4 Among other things,
she pointed out that "through the ages and the 10 Commandments
when they talked about thou shalt not kill that is a misnomer and not
true. It's the King James mistranslation of what should have been
thou shalt do no murder." 35
In terms of endorsement, it might be argued that remarks of this
sort do not communicate any sort of preference on the part of the
state for a particular religion (or for religion over nonreligion).
Rather, it might be argued that such remarks simply express, and are
understood as expressing, a practical recognition that many jurors ad-
here to certain religious beliefs and need assurance that they can vote
a particular way without violating those beliefs. More realistically,
however, such remarks are likely to send a message that the state re-
gards the dictates of a particular religion as important and worth fol-
lowing. If so, the Establishment Clause calls for their exclusion from
dosing arguments.
130 Id at 632.
131 As in Sidden, see supra note 128, the court denied that the remarks w'ere sufficiently
improper to call for reversal and apparently did so from a type of due process or fuinda-
mental fairness perspective. See Laws, 381 $.E.2d at 632-33.
132 See infra text accompanying notes 156-57.
133 929 P.2d 544 (Cal. 1997).
134 Id. at 580.
135 Id.
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At times courts have characterized uses of the Bible in closing
argument as "historical" and approved them on that basis. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's opinion in People v. Williams136 illustrates the
point. In his closing argument, the prosecutor in Willians had relied
on statements by Moses in the Book of Exodus to demonstrate that, in
the prosecutor's words, "capital punishment has been a principle of
justice for literally thousands of years." 137 Describing the prosecutor's
biblical discussion as "part of a short and fairly neutral 'history' of
capital punishment,"'3 8 the California high court rejected the defen-
dant's claim that it was inflammatory and prejudicial.
From an endorsement perspective, a Bible-as-history defense for a
use of religion is potentially significant, but only if two conditions are
met. First, the remarks in question must be citing the Bible as author-
ity for statements or events that secular versions of history would gen-
erally accept as factually accurate. Second, a reasonable observer
would be likely to understand that the Bible is not being cited as au-
thoritative because of its religious claim to authority. If both of these
conditions are met, use of the Bible as a "historical reference"'13 9 does
not send a message of state endorsement of religion. If, however, as
was almost certainly the situation in Bradford, they are not, then the
purportedly historical use of the Bible oversteps constitutional
bounds.
Some uses of the Bible in closing argument may be seen as pro-
viding, in the words of the court in Bussard v. Lockhard,140 "a more
poetic version" of a secular concept.' 4' In Bussard the defendant had
escaped after arrest and been a fugitive for four years.,' 2 In closing
argument, the prosecutor maintained that "Proverbs 28:1 fits it just as
clear as it can be. 'The guilty flee when no man pursueth while the
righteous stand bold as a lion.' He fled to avoid coming to trial. That
shows guilt."1 43 Reviewing a denial of a habeas petition, the Eighth
Circuit found this use of the Bible essentially nonreligious. According
to the court, the prosecutor did not invoke the Bible "to suggest that
the jury apply divine law as an alternative to the law of Arkansas."""'
Rather, he "simply resorted to Proverbs for a more poetic version of a
136 756 P.2d 221 (Cal. 1988).
137 Id. at 255.
138 Id.
139 Berry v. State, 93-DP-00059-SCT, 34, 703 So. 2d 269, 281 (Miss. 1997). In JBeny
the Mississippi Supreme Court approved as historical the prosecutor's use of the Bible to
show, in the court's words, "that Berry's psychological problems were not special because
they have been around since Biblical times." Id.
140 32 F.3d 322 (8th Cir. 1994).
141 Id. at 324.
142 Id. at 323.
143 Id. at 324.
144 Id.
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common-sense connection expressly recognized by Arkansas law:
flight suggests consciousness of guilL" 145
Although it is possible to invoke the Bible for "poetic" effect with-
out sending any message of state endorsement of religion, Bussanl il-
lustrates the endorsement hazards inherent in purportedly "simply...
poetic"'4 6 uses. A reasonable observer could be expected to under-
stand the prosecutor's use of Proverbs as state endorsement of religion.
After all, the prosecutor essentially told the jury to treat a religious
source as authoritative on the meaning of flight.
State v. Geddie 47 offers a variation on the Bussard court's more-
poetic-version justification for some uses of the Bible. In Geddie the
prosecutor borrowed a phrase from the Bible but, unlike the prosecu-
tor in Bussard, did not identify the Bible as its source. According to
the prosecutor, the defendant committed a murder for less than
"thirty pieces of silver"-a phrase from the New Testament account of
Judas's betrayal of Christ. 45 Almost certainly understating the notori-
ety of this phrase, the North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged
that "some jurors may have recognized that the words were bibli-
cal."' 49 Nonetheless, the court found that "the reference was
slight"150 and not a significant problem.
From an endorsement perspective, uses of the Bible like the one
in Geddie present as a threshold question whether a reasonable ob-
server is likely to recognize the unattributed use of the Bible as a bibli-
cal reference. Under the endorsement test as developed by the
Supreme Court, the reasonable observer is an informed observer,15'
which in this context means someone well acquainted with the Bible,
though presumably well acquainted for a lay person as opposed to a
biblical scholar or member of the clergy. If a reasonable observer is
not apt to recognize the biblical reference as such, there is no en-
dorsement effect.
145 Id.
146 &d.
147 478 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. 1996).
148 See id. at 160 (quoting Mattlew 27:3).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Justice O'Connor, whose concurring opinions in Lynch v. Donndly, 465 U.S. 663
(1984), and Wallace v.Jaffree 472 U.S. 38 (1985), were instrumental in consolidating sup-
port on the Court for an endorsement test, has discussed most fully the amount of knowl-
edge attributed to the reasonable observer. In addition to her opinions in Lin and
IaH=, see Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. %. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 77882 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 628-32 (1989)
(O'Connor,J., concurring). For a somewhat different view on this matter by a strong pro-
ponent of the endorsement test, see Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 799-800 & n.5 (StevensJ.,
dissenting).
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If, as in Geddie, a reasonable observer is apt to recognize the
source, then it becomes necessary to ask the question posed in cases
like Bussard: is a reasonable observer likely to perceive the biblical
reference as a statement by the state that religion should figure into
the jury's deliberations? The question calls for careful attention to
the particular words and context, but courts have every reason to ap-
proach such a question with a strong suspicion that a message of en-
dorsement is being sent. In Geddie itself the existence of an
endorsement effect should not be seriously in doubt. The prosecu-
tor's "thirty pieces of silver" allusion drew a vivid analogy to a biblical
event of great meaning and emotional significance to Christians. A
reasonable observer would readily perceive it as a statement that relig-
ion has an important part to play in the proceedings.
Finally, some cases suggest that a party's use of religion in closing
argument is less objectionable when offered to counter a religiously
based argument made by the other side. In People v. Bradford,'52 dis-
cussed above, the California Supreme Court was so tolerant of the
prosecutor's discourse on the biblical meaning of "kill" at least in part
because it came "in response to defense counsel's religious refer-
ences.' u53 In treating responsive uses of religion as less problematic,
the California high court was thinking in terms of due process and
state fair-trial objections. Regardless of whether such treatment of re-
sponsive uses makes sense from that perspective-a matter that we do
not address-it does not make sense from an Establishment Clause
perspective. Allowing one side to use religion because the other has
done so does nothing to dispel the message of endorsement sent by
the initial use. On the contrary, it compounds the endorsement effect
by confirming the initial suggestion that religion has a significant role
to play in the jury's deliberations. At least where the Establishment
Clause is concerned, two wrongs don't make a right.
2. Reversing the Burden of Proof
The Establishment Clause violations discussed in subsection 1 en-
tail some harms that may have little to do with the outcome of the
proceedings in which the religiously based closing arguments are
made. Like all endorsements of religion, these can be expected to
offend and alienate people who do not adhere to the endorsed relig-
ion. 54 In addition, these endorsements, like endorsements generally,
152 929 P.2d 544 (Cal. 1997).
'53 Id. at 580.
154 As Justice O'Connor phrased it, nonadherents are made to feel that "they are out-
siders, not full members of the political community." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connorj.,
concurring).
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unwittingly may have ill effects for the religion that they purport to
advantage. 155
Of vital importance for present purposes, however, the Establish-
ment Clause violations discussed in subsection 1 do in fact entail a
substantial likelihood of harm to the proceedings in which they occur.
When, as in State v. Sidden,156 a closing argument essentially tells the
jury that the Bible takes precedence over state law, the potential for
prejudice to the proceedings is unmistakable. Moreover, the poten-
tial for prejudice is also substantial when the message sent is not so
blatant an endorsement of religion. Any argument that communi-
cates to jurors that religion has an important place in the proceedings
carries with it a serious danger that jurors will look to their own relig-
ion rather than the law in deciding how to vote. Even an argument, as
in State v. Laws,'57 that uses religion to try to secure jury fidelity to the
commands of state law has the potential to prejudice the proceedings
by leaving jurors with the impression that the ultimate authority that
they must consult in arriving at a decision is their religion.
Under the above reasoning and the harmless-error doctrine of
Chapman v. California,158 a defendant attacking a conviction on the
basis of a prosecutorial closing argument that violates the endorse-
ment test should be able to secure a reversal unless the state can prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not
affect the outcome. 159 In light of the way in which courts have applied
the harmless-error rule to other types of constitutional violations,16) it
is unrealistic to expect that such a shift in the burden of proof on
prejudice from the defendant to the state will mean an enormous
155 For discussion of the various harms caused by endorsements, see Simson, supra
note 67, at 463-68.
156 491 S.E.2d 225, 231 (N.C. 1997).
157 381 S.E.2d 609, 632 (N.C. 1989).
158 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
159 See id. at 24 ("[ Age hold ... that before a federal constitutional error can be held
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it %%as harmless beyond a reasona-
ble doubt."); see also Sattenvhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257-58 (1988) (applying harmless-
error analysis to Sixth Amendment violation in capital trial). With constitutional errors
identified in federal habeas corpus proceedings, the Supreme Court has taken an ap-
proach to harmless error more friendly to the state. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619, 623 (1993) ("[T]he standard for determining whether habeas relief must be granted
is whether the... error 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict.'" (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946))).
160 See DanielJ. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constidtlional Rmedis, 61 U. Cn. L RE%. 1,
4 (1994) (noting the widely held view that "in the Supreme Court, as well as in state and
lower federal courts, errors of some substance are nonetheless found harmless so as to
permit the affirmance of convictions"). A recent study of harmless error encompassing
both constitutional and nonconstitutional errors and analyzing 963 federal appellate crimi-
nal cases decided between 1996 and 1998 found that the errors were held to be harmless in
87% of the cases. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error 30J. LaEu.
STUD. 161, 182, 184 (2000).
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change in reversal rates. Nonetheless, the shifting of the burden
should make reversal significantly more likely than with a due process
challenge, which places on the defendant from start to finish the bur-
den of proving prejudice.
Unlike appellate courts, trial courts are in a position to negate
the message of endorsement that religiously based closing arguments
send and thereby avoid prejudice to the proceedings. Most obviously,
the trial court can and should sustain an objection to a remark violat-
ing the endorsement test and tell the jury to disregard it. In addition,
with or without contemporaneous objection to such a remark, the
court can and should make clear in its instructions to the jury that the
remark was improper and why.
Since remarks by defense counsel cannot constitute government
endorsement of religion without the court's tacit approval of the re-
marks, 161 the trial court by using the above tactics clearly can negate
fully any message of endorsement that defense counsel's arguments
may send. By contrast, since remarks by the prosecutor are inherently
government action, it is at least arguable that a message of govern-
ment endorsement of religion communicated by the prosecutor's re-
marks may persist even after the court employs the above tactics.
Given, however, the court's ultimate authority to speak for the govern-
ment in the courtroom, any such lingering message of endorsement
almost certainly can be disregarded as too insubstantial to prejudice
the proceedings.
Finally, courts would be well-advised to follow Pennsylvania's lead
and adopt a per se rule barring appeals to religion in closing argti-
ment. Respect for Establishment Clause values and concern for the
fair and efficient administration ofjustice militate strongly in favor of
such a rule. On the one hand, appeals to religion in closing argument
almost always violate the Establishment Clause. On the other hand, a
bright-line rule would save trial and appellate courts valuable time and
resources and help ensure greater uniformity and evenhandedness in
decisionmaking.
IV
JuRy DELIBERATIONS
There is little question that capital jurors are frequently influ-
enced by their religious beliefs in deciding guilt or innocence and life
or death. Although the court's instructions on the law at both phases
provide guidelines for the jurors to take into account, there remains
ample room for the jurors' own values to come into play, and these
values often depend on the jurors' religious beliefs.
161 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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It is one thing, however, for jurors to be influenced to some ex-
tent by their religious beliefs. It is quite another for them to look
consciously to religion in their deliberations. Is it reversible error for
jurors to consult a Bible during deliberations? To engage in group
prayer? To debate guilt or innocence, or life or death, in terms of
religious precepts? To decide individually on religious grounds how
they are going to vote? In some instances, it is also fair to ask whether
the court or court officials acted in a way that wrongly encouraged the
jurors to take religion into account during deliberations. Is it revers-
ible error, for example, to sequesterjurors in hotel rooms uith a Bible
and little else on hand?
When raised at all, challenges along the above lines almost always
have been raised and decided in terms of the Sixth Amendment's im-
partial jury guarantee' 62 or analogous state protections. As discussed
below in section A, such challenges often face formidable state eviden-
tiary hurdles and rarely result in mistrials or reversals. As discussed in
section B, challenges framed in terms of the Establishment Clause
would have substantially greater force and chance of success.
A. Compounding the Difficulties of Proving Prejudice
Because jurors deliberate behind closed doors,juror testimony is
almost always essential to prove that religion played a part in their
deliberations. State evidence codes, however, typically place con-
straints on juror testimony that sharply limit the opportunity to offer
such proof. With provisions often patterned verbatim after Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b), the codes commonly preclude ajuror from
testifying "as to any matter or statement occurring during the course
of the jury's deliberations.., except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror."163
Under rules like 606(b), the only challenges that at times have
succeeded are those where a juror is willing to testify that religion
came into the deliberations via some "extraneous" or "outside"
source. In a number of cases, juror testimony has pointed to a Bible
or other religious book or pamphlet as such a source. According to
the testimony, ajuror brought the religious text into the jury room, or
perhaps consulted it outside the jury room during the period of delib-
162 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to... an impartialjury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed .. ").
163 FED. R. EvID. 606(b); see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 121-27 (1987)
(applying Rule 606(b) to bar inquiry into potential juror misconduct where several mem-
bers of the jury were alleged to have consumed drugs and alcohol during the trial).
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erations, and then used it either to persuade others or to guide his or
her own decision. 164 The prohibited source may also come in the
form of an individual who, at some point after the start of the deliber-
ations period, gives a juror religiously based advice outside the jury
room.165
Although challenges based on extraneous or outside sources
overcome the evidentiary hurdles erected by rules like 606(b), they
usually do not result in a mistrial or reversal. Courts typically find that
the party challenging the use of religion during deliberations did not
show a sufficient likelihood of prejudice to the proceedings. 166
Though recognizing that the challenged use was improper, the courts
ordinarily hold that, in light of other things said or done during trial,
it does not warrant relief.16 7 This tendency to discount the signifi-
164 See, e.g., People v. Mincey, 827 P.2d 388, 424 (Cal. 1992) (Juror testified that she
brought Bible into jury room after lunch recess to show that "'there's different views
[about capital punishment] that come from the Bible.'"); Neill v. State, 1997 OK CR 41,
10, 943 P.2d 145, 148 (Crim. App. 1997) (Two jurors stated in affidavits that Bible was
present injury room during deliberations.); State v. Kelly, 502 S.E.2d 99, 103 & n.3 (S.C.
1998) (Several jurors testified that one had circulated a pamphlet, God, Laup, and Capital
Punishment, that "expresses a pro-death penalty view and references Bible passages to sup-
port its view.").
165 This possibility is colorfully illustrated by Exparte Troha, 462 So. 2d 953 (Ala, 1984),
a noncapital case in which a juror telephoned his brother, a minister, in Mississippi and,
according to the juror's affidavit, "asked him for guidance and scripture references so as to
enable me to make a proper and just decision." Id. at 953-54.
166 State courts tend to analyze such claims on state-law grounds without making refer-
ence to federal constitutional law. To the extent that courts focus instead on the Sixth
Amendment's impartial jury guarantee, the requisite showing of prejudice seems essen-
tially the same, despite the Court's holding in Renmerv. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954),
that "[i]n a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or
indirectly, with ajuror during a trial is... deemed presumptively prejudicial." Id. at 229.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), cast
doubt on Renmers presumption of prejudice, suggesting instead that no constitutional vio-
lation will be found unless the defendant can demonstrate that the alleged intrusion or
misconduct resulted in actual prejudice. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 739 ("There may be cases
where an intrusion should be presumed prejudicial, but a presumption of prejudice as
opposed to a specific analysis does not change the ultimate inquiry: Did the intrusion if-
fect the jury's deliberation and thereby its verdict?" (citations omitted)); Phillips, 455 U.S.
at 215 ("This Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a
hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias." (emphasis ad.
ded)); see also United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he Returer
presumption of prejudice cannot survive Phillips and Olano.").
167 See, e.g., McNair v. State, 706 So. 2d 828, 838 (Ala. 1997) (concluding that "reading
from the Bible and praying in the jury room during deliberations[ ] was not of such a
character or nature as to indicate bias or corruption or misconduct that might have af-
fected the verdict or as to constitute prejudice as a matter of law"); People v. Mincey, 827
P.2d 388, 425 (Cal. 1992) (concluding that "there was no substantial likelihood that the
incident [involving the reading of biblical passages] prejudiced defendant"); People v.
Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 501-02 (Colo. 1986) (refusing to find that trial court abused its discre-
tion in failing to find prejudice in noncapital case where one juror allegedly read the Bible
to anotherjuror); State v. Barnes, 481 S.E.2d 44, 68 (N.C. 1997) (refusing to find that trial
court abused its discretion in declining to investigate "alleged Bible-reading incident"
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cance of the impropriety seems particularly pronounced when the
challenge is made while deliberations are still in progress. Rather
than find that a mistrial is warranted, courts are more likely to take
the view that they can cure any possible prejudicial effect by giving the
jury additional instructions.'r6
B. Stricter Scrutiny Under the Establishment Clause
Although court opinions in jury deliberation cases do not often
mention the Establishment Clause, they should. Establishment Clause
problems in this context take two basic forms. First, the judge or bai-
liff or other court official speaks or acts in a way during deliberations
that communicates to jurors that religion should play a part in their
decisionmaking. Second, the jurors as a group or one or more jurors
in the group speak or act in a way during deliberations that communi-
cates to the members of the group that religion should play a part in
their decisionmaking. As noted earlier, 169 though private citizens for
purposes other than theirjury service, the members of the jury should
be seen as state actors when serving as jurors. Our analysis of Estab-
lishment Clause problems that take the second form so assumes.
1. Official Communications toJurors
The Establishment Clause's prohibition against government en-
dorsement of religion forbids the judge or other court official from
conveying to jurors the message that they should take religion into
account in reaching their decision. Under the purpose prong of the
endorsement test, if the judge or other court official can be shown to
be speaking or acting entirely or almost entirely out of religious pur-
poses, the Establishment Clause has been violated. The Clause, how-
ever, also provides protection against government endorsement of
religion when such a strong showing of religious purpose cannot be
made. Under the effect prong of the endorsement test, if the judge
or other court official has spoken or acted in a way that reasonable
jurors are likely to understand as endorsing the use of religion in their
deliberations, the Establishment Clause has been violated as well.
Posting the Ten Commandments in the jury room is an obvious
example of state action barred under this analysis. The posting is so
difficult to explain in secular terms that a challenger may well be able
to show an exclusive or nearly exclusive religious purpose and thereby
where there ias "no evidence that the alleged Bible reading was in any -ay directed to the
facts or governing law at issue in the case").
168 See, e.g., Minceg, 827 P.2d at 425.
169 See supra text accompanying note 100.
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prove a violation of the endorsement test's purpose prong.170 In any
event, particularly in light of the efforts made by the state to limit
jurors' exposure to any outside influences during deliberations, the
posting is so likely to communicate to jurors that it is appropriate to
take religion into account in their deliberations that a violation of the
test's effect prong seems apparent.
Keeping a Bible in the jury room or approving ajuror's request to
bring one into the room17 1 is irreconcilable with the Establishment
Clause for essentially the same reasons. Even assuming, for purposes
of argument, that such state action passes muster under the very re-
laxed scrutiny mandated by the purpose prong of the endorsement
test, the effect of endorsement is so inescapable that the state action
cannot survive the test's effect prong.
Some cases have presented the interesting and much closer ques-
tion of whether the state violates the endorsement test when it seques-
ters jurors overnight in hotel rooms where there is a Bible and "little
else to do."1 72 In this instance, the state's action is considerably more
neutral. Those charged with sequestering the jury did not put the
Bible in the room and may not have given any thought to the possibil-
ity that one would be there. Moreover, even if they had given the
matter some thought, they may have felt that under the circumstances
it was appropriate to leave the Bible there to ensure that the seques-
tration would not interfere with some individuals' customary daily
prayer practices.
The state action in this hotel-room scenario almost certainly
would survive the purpose prong of the endorsement test. Particularly
since a purpose of lifting a state-imposed burden on free exercise is
regularly understood as "secular" under the endorsement test, 17-' the
slim showing of secular purpose needed to survive the purpose prong
is surely met. It is far from clear, though, that the state action in ques-
tion should survive the effect prong. Even assuming that the state may
have no intent whatsoever to influence the jurors to factor religion
into their decision, jurors may well perceive that the state is seeking to
influence them to do so. Having been instructed by the court to avoid
outside influences and having been placed in a controlled environ-
ment in an effort to ensure that they avoid such influences,jurors who
170 Cf Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-43 (1980) (finding that a state law requiring
that the Ten Commandments be posted in public school classrooms rested on a "pre-emi-
nent" purpose of endorsing religion and striking it down on that ground).
171 See, e.g., Jones v. Kemp, 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1558 (N.D. Ca. 1989).
172 Holladay v. State, 629 So. 2d 673, 678 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); see also Atkins v.
Moore, No. 97-17, 1998 WL 93409, at *8 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1998) (unpublished opinion)
(similar facts).
173 See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1987);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82-83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
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discover a Bible in their hotel room very reasonably could perceive
that the state is telling them that it is appropriate to consult the Bible
for assistance in reaching their decision.
Under the above analysis, states may well violate the Establish-
ment Clause when they sequester jurors in hotel rooms without re-
moving any Bible that is there. It should be noted, however, that this
does not mean that the Establishment Clause requires the state in se-
questering jurors to disallow individual jurors from bringing a Bible or
other book of prayer into their room. Indeed, where the juror needs
such a book to engage in customary prayer practices, the Free Exer-
cise Clause strongly supports allowing the juror to do so.1 7 "1 In keep-
ing with the Establishment Clause, however, the juror should be
expressly and clearly told that the juror's request is being granted en-
tirely out of respect for the juror's free exercise of religion, that the
state in no way means to endorse the use of religion in deciding the
case, and that the juror must decide the case at hand based on the law
as explained by the court rather than on any competing principles
that the juror may ascertain in the requested book.
2. Communications Among Jurors
Instances of group prayer among jurors in the jury room are
mentioned in a number of published opinions.175 Since no one but
the jurors ever learns that group prayer occurred unless ajuror volun-
teers the information, it seems fair to assume that the instances that
find their way into judicial opinions represent only the tip of the ice-
berg. If so, it is all the more striking and troubling that the case law is
virtually silent on the serious Establishment Clause concerns raised by
the practice.
Group prayer among jurors is irreconcilable with both prongs of
the Establishment Clause endorsement test. The practice is under-
taken by the members of the group virtually entirely for the nonsecu-
lar purpose of encouraging one another to seek divine inspiration and
guidance, and it has the inevitable effect of communicating among
the members that they should seek such inspiration and guidance.
The Supreme Court's approval of legislative prayer in Marsh v.
Chambers176 is not authority for a more indulgent view. In holding that
the Establishment Clause did not bar the longstanding practice of
174 After Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), it is difficult to argue that
the Free Exercise Clause requires the state to grant such a request. Although tie sequestra-
tion would seriously burden individual free exercise, Smith would appear to insulate the
state from challenge as long as the Bible is being excluded from the hotel room as part of a
neutral, generally applicable rule of excluding materials that might bias the deliberations.
175 See, eg., McNair v. State, 706 So. 2d 828, 835 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); Hoaladaq, 629
So. 2d at 678; State v. Graham, 422 So. 2d 123, 135 (La. 1982).
176 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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opening legislative sessions with prayer, the Court in Marsh essentially
carved out an exception from ordinary Establishment Clause princi-
ples based on the "unique history"' 77 of legislative prayer. According
to the Court, legislative prayer cannot sensibly be found to conflict
with the Establishment Clause because
[i] t can hardly be thought that in the same week Members of the
First Congress voted to appoint and to pay a chaplain for each
House and also voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment
for submission to the states, they intended the Establishment Clause
of the Amendment to forbid what they had just declared
acceptable. 178
Group prayer in the jury room lacks any such "unique history" that
might be felt to exempt it from ordinary Establishment Clause princi-
ples. Instead, like classroom prayer 179 and prayer at graduation cere-
monies, 180 it should be judged by, and found to fail, such principles.
Most obviously, a member of the jury panel who objects to the
group prayer should be able to challenge it successfully on Establish-
ment Clause grounds. Particularly in light of the very confining na-
ture of the jury room during deliberations, the objecting juror
experiences significant emotional, psychological, and constitutional
harm by the forced exposure to the group prayer and by the express
or tacit pressure to join in the prayer. If ajuror during deliberations
brings to the court's attention that group prayer is occurring, the
court should instruct the jury that as a matter of Establishment Clause
law the practice must cease.
The more difficult question is whether a defendant who learns of
the group prayer can successfully raise the Establishment Clause viola-
tion as a basis for securing a reversal of a conviction. Under the Chap-
man doctrine discussed earlier,l"1 the Establishment Clause violation
calls for reversal unless the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt
that it did not prejudice the proceedings. On the theory that such
group prayer is "strictly for support in arriving at a decision and for a
proper decision," 18 2 a court might conclude that the Establishment
Clause violation did not prejudice the proceedings. More realistically,
however, group prayer significantly affects the atmosphere in the jury
room and creates a substantial danger that jurors will base their deci-
177 Id. at 791.
178 Id. at 790. Whether or not the "unique history" of legislative prayer points as
strongly to the result in Marsh as the Court there suggests is another matter entirely. For
the view that it does not, see id. at 814-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179 See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
180 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290 (2000) (invalidating prayer at high school football games).
181 See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
182 Holladay v. State, 629 So. 2d 673, 678 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
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sion on religious principles rather than on the law as explained by the
judge. From this perspective, courts should understand the Establish-
ment Clause violation as requiring reversal.
If the group prayer comes to light prior to the verdict and the
defense or prosecution moves for a mistrial, the court's decision is
somewhat more complex. The court might recognize that group
prayer poses a substantial danger of prejudice to the proceedings but
conclude that additional instructions would render the danger incon-
sequential. Although such a conclusion may often be plausible, the
finding of an Establishment Clause violation obligates the court to err
on the side of granting a mistrial if there is reasonable doubt in the
case at hand whether, despite any instructions, the group prayer
would prejudice the proceedings.
Like group prayer, arguments based on religious principles seem
hardly uncommon in the jury room. Here, too, some instances of oc-
currence find their way into published opinions,183 but the absence of
any reliable vehicle for bringing such instances to light suggests that
the number of actual instances of occurrence is much greater. Also
like group prayer, jurors' religion-based arguments during delibera-
tions raise Establishment Clause concerns much weightier than the
case law's inattention to them suggests.
Largely as a result of evidentiary rules discussed earlier,"" jurors'
religion-based arguments almost never become an issue in the re-
ported cases unless the juror making the argument does so by citing
or quoting from a Bible or other religious text that the juror has at
hand. For purposes of Establishment Clause analysis, however, it is
not crucial whether ajuror makes religious arguments with or without
the Bible or other religious material at hand. Jurors who argue for
guilt or innocence or for death or life based on religious precepts,
rather than the law as explained by the judge, act contrary to Estab-
lishment Clause principles whether or not they can physically show
the other jurors the textual support for their claim. Either ay, their
arguments fly in the face of the Establishment Clause bar on endorse-
ment of religion, and to the extent that evidentiary rules have the
effect of excluding available evidence of an Establishment Clause vio-
lation, the rules should have to yield. 185
If such arguments come to light, the defendant may seek to use
them to impeach an adverse verdict in either of two ways. First, the
183 E.g., People v. Mincey, 827 P.2d 388,424 (Cal. 1992); People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496,
501 (Colo. 1986); State v. Harrington, 627 SM.W2d 345, 350 (Tenn. 1981).
184 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
185 According to one scholar, the rule forbidding the impeachment of jury verdicts "is
probably unconstitutional." Albert AV. Alschuler, The Suprnne Court and thefJn': Vir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review ofJujy Verdits, 56 U. Cm. L RE%,. 153, 222 (1989).
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defendant may contend that such arguments, like group prayer
among the jurors, create a religiously charged atmosphere in the jury
room-an atmosphere in which there is a substantial danger that in
reaching a verdict,jurors will fall back on their religious beliefs, rather
than follow the law as explained by the judge. The principal difficulty
with this line of attack is that while the group nature of the prayer
practice lends instant credibility to the claim of a pervasive effect on
the atmosphere in the room, the individualized nature of the religious
arguments militates against a finding of pervasive effect. To justify
such a finding based on religious arguments, the defendant almost
certainly would need to show that such arguments were made with
some frequency and by more than one juror, though perhaps re-
peated arguments by the jury foreperson might suffice. In addition,
although it would not be essential to show that the jurors making the
arguments had the Bible or other religious text at hand to support
their points, the presence in the jury room of such religious materials
would lend force to the atmospheric claim.
Second, the defendant may maintain that the religious argu-
ments establish that the juror or jurors who made the arguments de-
cided the case on religious rather than secular grounds. Like the first
line of attack, this one faces significant hurdles. In particular, such a
challenge must satisfy the Supreme Court's demanding approach to
impermissible purpose in the Establishment Clause area. Under that
approach, a decisionmaker's decision will not be held invalid based
on impermissible purpose unless the challenger can show that the de-
cision rested entirely or almost entirely on that purpose.'8 6 With an
otherwise valid verdict, secular reasons will always exist to support a
juror's decision to convict or sentence to death. As a result, a chal-
lenger cannot help but have a difficult task in trying to impeach a
juror's vote as predicated entirely or almost entirely on religious
purpose.
Nevertheless, as illustrated by State v. DeMille,18 7 there are at least
some instances in which this showing might be made. According to a
juror's affidavit in Demille, one juror told the others during delibera-
tions that she based her vote to convict on what she perceived to be a
186 For the view that the Court's approach is inconsistent with both the basic rationale
for invalidating laws based on impermissible purpose and the Court's approach to fimper
missible purpose in the equal protection area, see Simson, supra note 65, at 908-11. Ac-
cording to this critique, the Court should revise its approach to impermissible purpose
under the Establishment Clause and require the invalidation of any law that would not
have been adopted but for the consideration of such a purpose, regardless of whether that
purpose was exclusive, primary, or subordinate.
187 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 426-27 (Utah 1989)
(similar allegation ofjuror reliance on divine revelation).
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sign from God.1s s In addition, it is hardly out of the question that a
juror making a more straightfon-ard appeal to religious precepts
might do so with such forcefulness and single-mindedness that his or
her vote might be successfully challenged on impermissible purpose
grounds.
Finally, if, as we have suggested, group prayer and religious argu-
ments in the jury room come to official attention far less often than
they actually occur, the above after-the-fact approach to addressing
such communications among jurors leaves many Establishment Clause
violations untouched. To some extent, respect for the integrity and
effectiveness of the deliberation process-a respect mandated by both
sound policy and the Constitution's jury trial guarantee' 8 9-makes it
inevitable that some violations go unnoticed. The deliberation pro-
cess would be severely impaired if courts routinely attempted to root
out violations by undertaking or authorizing fishing expeditions dur-
ing or after deliberations into what was done and said in the jury
room.
To give the principles underlying the Establishment Clause their
due, however, courts should take aim at these inappropriate commu-
nications before they occur. In instructing the jury before deliberations
begin, the court should expressly address the role that religion prop-
erly may play in their deliberations. Jurors should be told that al-
though the court respects their freedom to engage in individual silent
prayer while deliberating the weighty matters before them, group
prayer is inconsistent both with the religious liberty of individual ju-
rors who may not wish to join in such prayer and with the state's and
the defendant's rights to have the case tried in an atmosphere condu-
cive to dispassionate, objective application of the law as explained by
the court They should also be instructed that although the court re-
spects the various precepts that individual jurors' religions may offer
relevant to the facts of the case, jurors are expected to debate and
decide the case without favor to any religious view and according to
the law as explained by the court.
Most obviously, courts are free to offer the above instructions as a
matter of sound policy. A good argument can also be made, however,
that the Establishment Clause should be interpreted to require courts
188 Specifically, the affidavit alleged that the juror in question told the others that she
had prayed that the defense attorney make eye contact ith her during closing argument if
he was telling the truth and that she concluded from his failure to make such eye contact
that the defendant was guilty. DeMie, 756 P.2d at 83. The trial court excluded the alfida-it
under Utah's version of Rule 606(b), and the Utah Supreme Court agreed that it did not
come within the rule's exception for testimony about outside influences. IL at 84. For the
view that the rule's outside-influence exception should be understood to encompass in-
stances of divine revelation, see id at 85-86 (Stewamt,J., dissenting).
189 See U.S. CONSr. amend. VI.
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to give instructions along these lines and that courts' failure to give
such instructions should be treated as reversible error. The instruc-
tions could be seen as prophylactic rules needed to guard against Es-
tablishment Clause violations that could not be detected without
undermining another constitutional guarantee-that of trial by jury.
Although an interpretation of the Establishment Clause as mandating
instructions of this sort may strike some as insufficiently rooted in the
Clause's history and text, it has special appeal and justification as an
accommodation of conflicting constitutional demands. It also has no-
table, though controversial, precedential support in the jurispruden-
tial model employed in Miranda v. Arizona.190
CONCLUSION
With questions of life and death hovering over the proceedings, it
is no great surprise that the various participants in capital trials have
religion on their minds. Much more surprising is how little lawyers,
courts, and scholars seem to think about the First Amendment's Relig-
ion Clauses when one of the participants uses religion in a way apt to
influence the outcome of the proceedings. The Religion Clauses not
only speak directly to the legitimacy of such uses but, as demonstrated
in this Article, place important constraints on those uses beyond the
constraints established by other constitutional guarantees. Ultimately,
if the message of the Religion Clauses is heard, religion will play a
much less significant role in death penalty cases than it plays today.
On one level, the notion that greater respect for freedom of religion
means a lesser role for religion may seem somewhat paradoxical. One
of the great lessons of the Religion Clauses, however, is that the indi-
vidual liberty at the heart of the Clauses is often best served by govern-
ment noninvolvement in matters of religion. In this instance, as in
many others, a very limited role for religion in the operations of gov-
ernment is both good for government and good for religion.
190 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-hi-
crimination requires, as a means of deterring violations of the privilege apt to go unde-
tected or unproven, that the police administer specified warnings to persons taken into
custody); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda).
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